Australian-American disagreements concerning the Pacific counter-offensive and peace settlement with Japan were essentially a continuation of bilateral friction over Allied strategic priorities and consultation arrangements precipitated by the rapid Japanese advances early in 1942. Unable to induce the Roosevelt Administration to abandon its support for the Anglo-American plan to ‘defeat Hitler first’, the Curtin Government expressed constant and bitter disapproval of American policies. This criticism was only slightly modified after the Pacific War Council in Washington and MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific Area Command were formed during March-April, 1942. If Australia’s criticisms of United States policies were sometimes muted during the dark months of the war against Japan, it was because the small power could not risk undermining wartime collaboration with its principal ally, not because it was satisfied with the wartime alliance. However, as the possibility of a Japanese victory receded after late 1943, overt Australian criticism of American policies assumed a sharper and more forceful character.

Contrasting Australian and United States Objectives

Allied military advances in Europe and the Pacific by early 1944 foreshadowed ultimate victory over the Axis powers. A marked increase in the relative economic and military contribution of the United States to the Allied war effort accompanied these advances. The balance of military power within the coalition steadily shifted to the United States and the Soviet Union. The Roosevelt Administration was aware of the precipitous decline in Britain’s ‘relative military and economic strength’ and the concomitant ‘phenomenal development of heretofore latent Russian military and economic strength’. Secretary of State Cordell Hull was advised that this change appeared ‘certain to prove epochal in its bearing on future politico-military international relationships’. The principal consequence of this altered distribution of global power, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff observed prophetically, would be the emergence of unprecedented Soviet influence in Europe and Asia. ‘In estimating Russia’s probable course as regards Japan’, the Joint Chiefs concluded:

we must balance against such assurances as we have received from Russia, the fact that whether or not she enters the war, the fall of Japan will leave Russia in a dominant position on continental Northeast Asia, and, in so far as military power is concerned, able to impose her will on all that region.  

It was not until early 1945, however, that concern with emerging Russian power dominated American politico-military decision making. Yet at no time during 1944-45 did the United States seriously contemplate giving the Soviet Union, or indeed its other allies, an equal or effective role in determining or maintaining the postwar settlement in the Pacific. When Germany capitulated in May 1945, the Truman Administration was prepared to concede the theoretical right of the major Allied belligerents in the Pacific war to share in the military occupation of Japan. It was also prepared to consult with some of these powers. But it opposed formation of Allied zones of occupation similar to those established in occupied Germany, and insisted successfully that responsibility for interpreting and implementing ‘Allied’ policy in Japan rest ultimately with the United States. Soviet reluctance to sustain the temporary wartime alliance following victory over Germany, and growing American suspicion of Soviet intentions in occupied Germany and
Eastern Europe, hardened America’s determination to dominate the Far Eastern counter-offensive and monopolise the control of defeated Japan. America’s efforts to exclude or restrict Soviet influence in the Far East resulted in similar attempts to circumscribe the military and political role of the other Allied Powers in the counter-offensive and occupation of Japan. Hence relations between the United States and Australia were indirectly, but nonetheless decisively, influenced by the altered distribution of world power and the disintegration of the Great Power alliance during the transition to peace.

America’s efforts to decide unilaterally the future of Japan were also influenced by a desire to acquire unqualified control of strategic bases in the North and Central Pacific. The fervour of American anticolonialism declined during the late war years as it gained control of former Japanese territories in the North Pacific, and contemplated unilateral or joint control of Allied bases South of the Equator. America’s expanded interests in the Pacific, and its decision to monopolise all aspects of the peace settlement with Japan, were justified on the grounds that America’s contribution to victory had been decisive and unequalled by the combined role of all other Pacific Allies.

Australia’s power and influence in the Pacific compared to that of Britain, and to a lesser degree the United States, increased markedly after 1941. The Dominion’s altered international status and expanded regional ambitions were reflected in its independent initiatives concerning the Pacific War Council in Washington, the direction of Allied global policy, withdrawal of its troops from the Middle East, and formation of the Canberra Agreement with New Zealand, during 1942-44. In part, these initiatives were attempts to compensate for the decline of Britain’s interest, prestige and influence in the Far East. Yet if Australia’s relative power had increased by 1944-45, it nonetheless remained, at most, a ‘middle’ power. Implicit in its attempts to act in concert with other Commonwealth powers, especially New Zealand and Britain, during the counter-offensive and negotiation of a Pacific settlement, was the realisation that it could not promote its perceived regional interests or influence American Pacific policy when acting in complete isolation from the British Commonwealth. Hence, by sustaining combined British Commonwealth authority in world affairs, and influencing the direction of Commonwealth policy in the Pacific, Australia hoped to supplement its expanded regional power and promote specific political objectives during negotiation of the Pacific settlement.

The frequent, diverse and assertive attempts by Australia to participate in and influence the counter-offensive and occupation of Japan were largely negated by America’s determination to monopolise all major aspects of the final phase of the war and the Pacific peace settlement. Despite a significant military contribution to victory in the Pacific, close collaboration with Britain and repeated separate requests for more equitable consultative arrangements amongst Allied powers engaged in the Pacific war, Australia failed to exert a decisive influence on American policy towards Japan either before or after the armistice.

The Counter-Offensive

Australia’s decision to recall its troops from the Middle East during the early months of war against Japan was designed to reinforce its precarious local defences. It foreshadowed determined efforts by Prime Minister John Curtin and External Affairs Minister Dr H.V. Evatt to concentrate Australia’s war effort in the Pacific. Underlying this policy, the US Minister in Canberra, Nelson Johnson, noted, was the conviction that maximum use of ANZAC forces in the Pacific ‘would give Australia the right to insist upon having its voice heard and considered in the making of any plans by the United States for the future of the Pacific’. The political aims of this military strategy were clearly
emphasised in the controversial Australia-New Zealand Agreement signed in Canberra during January 1944. The central clauses of the Agreement were directed against anticipated American policy in the Pacific and Japan. Predictably it provoked a hostile reaction in Washington.5 Both Dominions stipulated that ‘no change in the sovereignty or system of control of any of the islands of the Pacific should be effected’ without explicit Australian and New Zealand concurrence, and foreshadowed a forceful ANZAC role in the Japanese counter-offensive in order to ensure ‘representation at the highest level on all armistice and executive bodies’.6 By 1944 postwar political considerations, not immediate military necessity, were the principal determinants of Australia’s military role in the Pacific and its relations with the United States. In 1945 General (later Field Marshal) Sir Thomas Blamey conceded that the level and location of Australia’s military effort ‘was a purely political and not a strategical question’.7 As early as June 1943 the Anglo-American Chiefs of Staff had observed that despite a desire to reduce the number of men in the armed forces, the Curtin Government was anxious to maintain its war effort ‘on a scale which, taken with the Commonwealth’s earlier record in the war, would guarantee her an effective voice in the peace settlement’ but not prejudice the need ‘to resume a proper balance between the direct military program and its industrial basis’.8

Attempts to continue a prominent war role were part of a broader effort to use combined British Commonwealth participation in the Pacific as a vehicle for expanding Australia’s postwar influence in the region. At the London Prime Ministers’ Conference in May 1944, for example, Curtin and Churchill agreed that a British force based in Australia would increase the Commonwealth’s contribution to Japan’s defeat, possibly permit a combined Commonwealth force to recapture Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies, compensate for declining British prestige in the Far East, and strengthen relations between their two countries. Curtin confidently anticipated a British presence in the Pacific, as Anglo-American decisions made at Cairo late in 1943 had ‘approved in principle as a basis for further investigation and preparation’ a Plan for the Defeat of Japan which provided for an initial British Task Force in the Pacific by June, 1944.9 However in March, 1944, Churchill asked to be released from this undertaking’.10 Nonetheless, Curtin and Evatt continued to press for British participation. The unexpected speed of the United States’ advance against Japan gave this aim new urgency after mid-1944.

Curtin advised Churchill in July that the rapid advance by America’s forces threatened to make any major operations by British Commonwealth forces redundant. He suggested that the British Navy be used to complement the American contribution as soon as possible, as this was ‘the only effective means of placing the Union Jack in the Pacific alongside the Australian and American flags’. The ‘pace of events here demands immediate action’, he concluded.11 In August Curtin again emphasised the political implications of virtual British exclusion from the counter-offensive: ‘I am deeply concerned’, he told Churchill, ‘at the position which would arise if any considerable American opinion were to maintain that America fought a war on principle in the Far East and won it relatively unaided’.12

Australia’s consistent requests for an expanded British Commonwealth role in the counter-offensive were conditioned largely by postwar political considerations. But they also reflected growing dissatisfaction with MacArthur’s command13 and Cabinet’s fear of allied American territorial interests south of the Equator. Hence Australia encouraged the use of the Royal Navy in the Central Pacific, an Australian presence in the Philippines campaign under MacArthur’s general command, and increased command and operational autonomy for Australia’s forces retained to neutralise the South-West Pacific Area. While favouring a combined British task force in the Pacific, Curtin and Blamey apparently endorsed appointment of an Australian, not a British officer, as commander of this
proposed new section of MacArthur’s overall command. Australia hoped to direct, not tacitly support, combined Commonwealth operations in the counter-offensive. Despite Anglo-Australian differences over the form and leadership of the proposed force, by early 1944 Australian policy implicitly supported the British Foreign Office suggestion that ‘if there is to be no major British role in the Far Eastern war, then it is no exaggeration to say that the solidarity of the British Commonwealth and its influence in the machinery of peace in the Far East will be irretrievably damaged.’

Although the Second Quebec Conference accepted in principle that the Royal Navy participate in the main operations against Japan, the United States continually attempted to restrict the role of its Pacific allies in the final phase of the war. ‘Deployment of British forces does not involve strategy – they can neither hasten nor retard strategy’, the War Department observed: ‘Deployment must be based solely on high political policy’. To implement its basic political objectives America initially attempted to assert control over all Japanese mandates and territory, and to maintain its dominant influence in the Philippines and China. It sought to retain unrestricted American access to necessary bases throughout the Pacific. The virtual exclusion of British Commonwealth or Soviet influence from the North Pacific settlement was necessary to ensure that these objectives were easily obtained. During the final two years of war the US Chiefs of Staff consistently refused to share the control of operations against Japan. This decision was justified on the grounds of America’s overriding military contribution to, and operational control of, the war against Japan during 1941-43. It was designed partly to ensure military unity and efficiency. But it also reflected a determination to retain unilateral domination of ‘operations and activities in the Pacific and China’ during the transition to peace.

This policy was reaffirmed during 1945 in response to growing Soviet ambitions in Eastern Europe, the collapse of the Yalta agreements, and the widening Soviet-American rift over the occupation of Germany. The Truman Administration was anxious to restrict Soviet influence in the Far East and to avert repetition of Soviet-American friction over Japan similar to that emerging over the occupation of Germany. As early as July 1944 the US Chiefs of Staff had warned:

After the defeat of Japan, the United States and the Soviet Union will be the only military powers of the first magnitude...While the United States can project its military power into many areas overseas, it is nevertheless true that the relative strength and geographic positions of these two powers preclude the military defeat of one of these powers by the other even if that power was allied to the British Empire.

By May 1945 the Truman Administration had accepted the need to limit Soviet penetration in the Far East by excluding it from an effective role in the counter-offensive. It also contemplated strengthening either Japan or China after the war in order to provide a counterweight to Soviet influence. Immediately after the surrender of Germany a special State-War-Navy Committee concluded that the occupation of Japan should be centralised under American control and not based on national zones of control like the occupation of Germany. President Truman endorsed the Committee’s suggestion that ‘The major share of the responsibility for military government and the preponderance of forces used in Japanese occupation should be American, and the designated Commander of all occupational forces...and the principal subordinate Commanders should be American’. The following month a White House meeting attended by President Truman, Admiral Ernest J. King, General George C. Marshall, Henry L. Stimson and James V. Forrestal accepted the suggestion that ‘Anything
smacking of combined command in the Pacific might increase the difficulties with Russia and perhaps with China’. 21

Closer Anglo-Australian co-operation was in part a reaction to America’s reluctance to share responsibility in the Pacific. Despite acute manpower problems, the Australian Government was anxious to contribute to ‘the proposed Commonwealth force for the invasion of Japan’ or to a separate Australian force which might be assured direct representation at the invasion. 22 The surrender of Germany in May 1945, enabled the Allies to concentrate available military strength in the Pacific and demobilise some troops. Although anxious to substantially demobilise, in June Australia requested that the US Chiefs of Staff associate remaining Australian troops ‘with the forward movement against Japan under General MacArthur.’ The formal submission made to the Washington Chiefs clearly stated the political implications of this military policy:

> From the aspect of prestige and participation in the Pacific peace settlement and control machinery, the government considers that it is of great importance to Australia to be associated with the drive to defeat Japan. 23

Australia remained anxious both to be associated with the forward offensive and to maintain a conspicuous military presence in this offensive.

However, the United States remained opposed to sharing high strategic control of operations in the Northern Pacific, and resisted efforts by other powers to employ ‘token’ national forces in the Northern Pacific offensive. During 1944-1945 it maintained that combined Allied control of high strategy in Europe could not ‘appropriately be applied to the Pacific war’ because Pacific operations were ‘organised under a command and control set-up peculiar to the United States’, and were overwhelmingly dominated by the ‘forces and resources’ of the United States. 24 The abrupt surrender of Japan following the atomic bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, signalled the unsuccessful conclusion of Australia’s attempts to achieve a prominent separate or combined Commonwealth military role with American forces in the forward offensive against Japan. However, Australia relied on independent diplomatic initiatives as well as military policy to promote its ambitious regional objectives.

Consultation

Following Australia’s exclusion from the Cairo Conference late in 1943, Evatt again appealed for closer consultation so as to ensure that subsequent inter-Allied conference decisions would result from the ‘reasoned deliberation of all’ interested powers, not in ‘pronouncements by a selected few’. 25 During 1943-1945, however, Australia, like all other small or middle powers, was excluded from the critical Great Power conferences on the European and Pacific peace settlements held at Moscow, Teheran, Quebec and Yalta. Nor did it succeed in gaining American support for the conference of Pacific powers foreshadowed in the Canberra Agreement. These failures encouraged Curtin to promote a new Empire Council to improve Commonwealth consultation and nurture ‘concerted Empire policy’ which reflected the interests of the Dominions as well as Great Britain. 26 It also influenced Australia’s attempts to use the United Nations Conference on International Organisation during April-May 1945 as a forum for democratising consultative contacts between the major and minor world powers.

Shortly after the capitulation of Germany, Evatt asked Truman to establish regional ‘consultative machinery of a character which would be at least as effective as that of the Pacific War Council.’ He also requested active support from Truman for his request that the President prevent ‘any discussion either of Armistice or peace arrangements in relation to Japan unless Australia is treated as a principal in the matter’. 27 This request
was motivated by acute disappointment with the method employed by the United States and the other major Allied powers in accepting the surrender of various European Axis states during late 1944 to May 1945. The Declaration of Allied Nations, signed 1 January 1942, pledged signatory states ‘not to make a separate armistice or peace’ with any enemy state. Evatt argued that this Declaration ‘was clearly broken whenever armistices were signed by the major Allied Powers without the express authority of other Allied Powers at war with that particular Axis country.’ A similar conclusion was reached by the State Department. Evatt later complained that when they negotiated the European armistices the ‘major powers purported to act “in the interests of” all other belligerents, even though they did not have the authority so to act.’

**The Armistice**

During 1945 Evatt’s persistent efforts to democratise inter-allied consultation over the proposed Japanese armistice and postwar control were also largely ineffective. At the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, Britain and China endorsed an American-sponsored joint declaration to Japan. However, the Soviet Union and other allies did not concur before the controversial document was issued. The declaration reflected Washington’s belief that Japan would continue military resistance rather than accept unconditional surrender. It did not call for unconditional surrender, but merely requested that the Government ‘proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces.’ The Emperor reportedly accepted these terms ‘without hesitation’, but they were rejected by military authorities.

Australia was not advised that the Potsdam meeting would issue an ultimatum to Japan, presumably because Britain was unaware of America’s intention to raise this matter. However, it was advised informally by the Foreign Office that a preliminary study of possible surrender terms was being undertaken in London and Washington. External Affairs immediately began to finalise its policy for submission to the major powers. However, the Potsdam Declaration was issued shortly before Australia’s official views reached Washington or London. ‘Not only was there no warning’ of the ultimatum, an Australian official complained, ‘but we were led...to believe that the whole matter was still in the stage of preliminary departmental consideration.

The Labor Government reacted swiftly and bitterly to this exclusive Great Power decision. On 29 July Evatt stated publicly:

> Ever since 1941 it has been the declared and accepted policy of the Australian Government that in all matters relative to the peace settlement, both in Europe and the Pacific, Australia, being an active belligerent, possesses the right to the status of a party principal to every armistice and peace arrangement...The recent Potsdam ultimatum to Japan makes it necessary to restate this fundamental policy. Although that ultimatum declared certain terms or principles of peace settlement with Japan, it was published without prior reference to, still less the concurrence of, the Australian Government.

While prepared to accept ‘Big-Power Leadership’, Evatt argued that it was ‘an indispensable corollary of such leadership that other nations which have shared the tremendous burden and sacrifices should have the correlative right to share in the planning and making of the armistice and peace arrangements, especially where their interest is direct and substantial’. Britain’s explicit recognition of Australia’s right to direct participation as a party principal in all peace settlement discussions, and the fact that responsibility for the terms of the ultimatum rested essentially with the Truman Administration, a meant that Evatt’s protest was unmistakably designed for American consumption. John Minter advised the new Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, that
Evatt’s protest was directed primarily against the continued failure of the United States to consult with Australia.37

Although deeply concerned at its exclusion from preliminary peace planning, the Australian Government was equally disturbed by the direction of American policy as defined in the Potsdam Declaration. ‘All that need be said about the actual terms of the peace foreshadowed in the ultimatum,’ Evatt protested, ‘is that they appear to treat Japan more leniently than Germany, in spite of the fact that the slightest sign of tenderness towards Japanese imperialism is entirely misplaced’.38

Four days after the first atom-bomb devastated Hiroshima on 6 August 1945, and one day after a second bomb was dropped on Nagasaki, Japan advised that it would accept the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, provided these ‘did not compromise the prerogative of the Emperor as sovereign ruler of Japan’. Britain immediately informed Australia of this decision. Australia responded on 11 August by asserting that the ‘Emperor should have no immunity from responsibility for Japan’s acts of aggression and proved war crimes,’39 and requesting that an unconditional surrender, not a negotiated or contractual peace be imposed on Japan. These arguments were communicated to the United Kingdom only. Initially Australia relied on the Foreign Office to transfer its views to Washington. It apparently believed that America’s policy towards Japan could only be altered by combined Commonwealth opposition.40

Partly in response to Australia’s requests, Britain advised Washington that the text of the Allies’ surrender ultimatum and the procedure to implement it should be settled by inter-Allied agreement. However this proposal was received by the State Department shortly after it had unilaterally formulated an ‘Allied’ surrender proposal and forwarded it to Japan. Instructions from Evatt to the Australian Minister in Washington, Frederic Eggleston, outlining Cabinet’s interpretation of necessary surrender terms and requesting that the Emperor be treated as a war criminal, arrived at the Washington Legation after ‘Truman’s reply to the Japanese’ via the Swiss Government ‘had already been dispatched.’41 Japan accepted the surrender terms on 15 August. The same day America adopted a Draft Act of Surrender which corresponded closely to these surrender terms. Eggleston consulted Byrnes on 13 August in an effort to support Britain’s demands for meaningful inter-Allied consultation during determination of the terms of the final Draft Act of Surrender. Although Byrnes stated that Australia’s position was ‘appreciated’, the State Department announcement of the Draft Act of Surrender was accompanied by an assertion that the United States was ‘not in a position to consult their allies’. Despite a combined British Commonwealth protest, the State Department remained ‘unwilling’ to conduct formal consultations with Britain or the Dominions because it did ‘not intend to invite comments’ from the Soviet Union or China.42 In discussions with Eggleston, Byrnes intimated that the problems deriving from Soviet participation in the German occupation were ‘inducing the Americans’ to make the other peace in a different form’.43 He also observed that United States policy in Japan resulted primarily from two factors: ‘one, the intense desire of the Americans to end the war and avoid further casualties, and second, the recognition of the difficulties in Germany’.44

Despite the Labor Cabinet’s assumptions to the contrary, Australia’s protracted and substantial military contribution to the Pacific victory did not ensure it a responsible role in determining the terms of the Japanese surrender or Allied occupation policy in Japan. Indeed, it was only after vigorous protests that the Truman Administration consented to give Australia separate, direct representation at the formal surrender ceremony in Tokyo. As early as November, 1944, Australia and New Zealand affirmed their intention ‘to ensure that their Governments are consulted in regard to the drafting of the armistices
with Japan and Thailand, that they are represented directly at the conclusion of the armistices, and that they have the right of participating in the armistice control arrangements’. Denied direct consultation in drafting the surrender term, Australia was determined to implement the final two aspects of this policy.

When notifying Britain of the Allied surrender terms, Truman proposed that MacArthur be designated Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, with exclusive responsibility to accept, coordinate, and implement the surrender of Japanese forces. He also proposed that Clement Attlee nominate an officer to represent Britain at the surrender. Australia was notified of America’s decisions by the British Government when Attlee suggested the Dominion nominate a service representative to be attached to the British representative at the Tokyo ceremony. New Zealand quickly agreed to a similar request from the British Prime Minister; but Australia refused to nominate a representative. Instead, on 14 August Evatt criticised Truman’s proposal and requested separate Australian representation at Tokyo. Cabinet gave Evatt’s request unqualified support. The American Legation in Canberra was advised that Australia felt ‘very strongly’ that it ‘should participate in the simultaneous surrender announcement’, and be represented separately at the surrender ceremony. H.V. Evatt viewed ‘it as unthinkable that Australia – which barring the United States has contributed proportionately more with bases, works, supplies and fighting men to bring about the present happy development than any of the Big-Four – should be deprived’ of these honours.

On 17 August the Australian Government announced somewhat ambiguously that General Blamey was going to Manila ‘to join the Headquarters of General MacArthur for the surrender ceremony’. Privately, it advised that Blamey had been nominated ‘to represent Australia in its own right at the general Japanese surrender’. However, without America’s concurrence, Blamey could only act as an official observer at Tokyo. The decision to nominate Blamey as its separate representative was made while America’s policy still contemplated restricting direct Allied representation at Tokyo to high-ranking officers from Britain, Russia and China. Minter warned Byrnes that exclusion of Blamey from direct, separate representation would ‘seriously’ jeopardise Australian co-operation with America in postwar Japan, and emphasised: ‘I have not yet encountered such strong language of official protest as I have during this episode’.

The Truman Administration promptly modified its policy to accommodate the protests of Australia and other small powers. On 21 August the State Department formally recommended to MacArthur that representatives of Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Holland and France separately sign the Instrument of Surrender with Japan. This recommendation was apparently influenced by representations made to MacArthur by Blamey. ‘MacArthur’s help appears to have been enlisted’, Eggleston wrote in a note to Evatt: ‘I congratulate you on your success, but I am not sure whether it has endeared us with the State Department’. Byrnes also acknowledged that Australia had by-passed his Department and enlisted MacArthur’s support.

Although pleased with its belated separate representation at Tokyo, the Chifley Government was not convinced that America was prepared to regard the Dominion as a ‘party principal in all proceedings associated with the Japanese settlement’. Inconsistently, it protested against the inclusion of such powers as France, Canada, and the Netherlands in the Tokyo ceremony because the contribution of these powers to the Pacific war was allegedly less significant than that of Australia. Nonetheless, during the transition to peace, Australia premised its appeals for representation in the Japanese armistice and occupation on the assertion that its wartime record validated such demands: ‘In view of the special contribution in the war against Japan’ Evatt requested that Byrnes support Australia’s efforts to participate as an ‘independent’ military force.
in the occupation of Japan and ‘to take part as a principal in the Allied Control Council for Japan or any other body corresponding thereto’. 52

**Occupation and Control**

Combined Allied pressure induced the United States to acquiesce in compromise political and military arrangements for occupied Japan, but did not effect a significant alteration of fundamental American policy. In theory, the United States was ‘committed to consultation with the Allies at war with Japan’ on all matters related to the Pacific peace settlement. 53 However, on 17 August the Dominions’ Secretary warned that America ‘was pushing on with plans for the control of Japan with all possible speed’ and not attempting to incorporate the views of its British allies in these plans. 54 While Australia and Britain were discussing Allied control policy, the Truman Administration issued a crucial document outlining its ‘Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan’. Prepared jointly by the State, War and Navy Departments, the policy was forwarded secretly to MacArthur on 29 August, but not made public until late September. It stated, in part:

> although every effort will be made, by consultation and by constitution of appropriate advisory bodies, to establish policies for the conduct of the occupation and the control of Japan which will satisfy the principal Allied powers, in the event of differences of opinion among them, the policies of the United States will govern. 55

A week before this policy was finalised, the US Chiefs of Staff advised that responsibility for the control of Japan had been vested exclusively in MacArthur acting as Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (SCAP) in Japan, and would ‘be exercised by the United States throughout (the) occupation period’. They designated only the United Kingdom, Soviet Union and China as principal allies, but relegated the possible influence which these powers could exert on occupation policy to a purely advisory function. In the event of lack of agreement amongst the major powers, MacArthur was advised, the United States ‘will assume responsibility for issuing directives for control of Japan’. 56 Eggleston commented accurately: ‘This takes the view that as (the) United States won the war in the Pacific, she will determine the peace; she will consult her Allies, but in the case of a difference between them, United States’ view will prevail’. 57

The Initial Post-Surrender Policy made two concessions to growing Allied demands for broader involvement in policy-making; it committed the United States to participate in ‘appropriate advisory bodies’, and reiterated America’s approval of Allied military participation in the occupation. But while prepared to use the troops of other powers, the United States stipulated that occupation forces, irrespective of their national origin, would be placed under the overall ‘command of a Supreme Commander designated by the United States’. 58 As expressed privately within the State Department, American policy was ‘to “allow” rather than “encourage” other Allied contingents’ to participate. 59

Three days before the Tokyo ceremony, Chifley announced that he intended to make available ‘an Australian force to participate in the occupation of Japan itself’. This decision implied that Cabinet opposed a British recommendation that Australia contribute to a combined British Commonwealth Occupation Force, comprising Australian, British-Indian, New Zealand, and Canadian troops, operating under a British commander. Chifley acknowledged that the decision was prompted by a desire that an Australian force should ‘have the same status as the occupying forces being supplied by the United States, Britain, China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics’. 60 It
aimed to reinforce Australia's claim to be recognised ‘as a primary and not a secondary
Pacific power’.61

Evatt, however, in London at this time, did not fully endorse Chifley’s policy
statement. On 14 September Evatt requested that Cabinet reconsider Britain’s suggestion
for a combined force. If a Commonwealth force was commanded by an Australian, and
executive authority over it exercised from Australia, Evatt argued, it might affirm rather
than undermine ‘Australian leadership in Pacific affairs and in the Pacific settlement’.62
Moreover, there was little prospect of Chifley’s original proposal being accepted by
Washington. War Cabinet promptly accepted Evatt’s submission. On 19 September it
approved participation in a combined British Commonwealth Occupation Force –
provided this was commanded by an Australian, controlled primarily from headquarters
based in Australia, and gave the commander direct access to the Supreme Allied
Commander. As Evatt had confidently anticipated, Britain accepted these proposals.63

Although prepared to contribute to a combined Empire force, Australia was unwilling to
submerge its growing political or military identity in the Pacific by joining a force not
manifestly under Australian control and substantially Australian in composition. Only by
participating in a combined force with Britain could Australia ensure that it could not be
completely excluded from the occupation on the grounds that it was not a leading Pacific
power.

It was not until 31 January 1946 that the United States finally accepted the
Commonwealth Force. The Sydney Morning Herald reflected growing criticism of the
delay when it stated:

The British Empire occupation force ought to have been organised quickly and have followed the
Americans into Japan within two or three months at the latest. The impression that it is neither
needed nor wanted has grown as delay has followed delay.64

The first Australian troops arrived in Tokyo in February. Australia supplied 12,000 of
the total Commonwealth Force of 36,000 troops. Compared to the American contingent
of almost 400,000 troops, the belated commitment of the small combined British force
was obviously of limited military significance.65 At most it gave Australia token
representation in the occupation, but did not afford it an independent or effective role in
determining occupation policies. Nor did Australia’s participation in inter-Allied
political councils established during late 1945 enable it to influence significantly the
occupation and control policies imposed on Japan.

By August-September 1945 Australia was deeply perturbed by both the method of
policy formation and the content of American (or ‘Allied’) policy in defeated Japan.66
Evatt and Chifley attempted to gain British, and occasionally Soviet, support for a series
of initiatives designed to reduce America’s domination of Allied policy. These
initiatives induced the Truman Administration to share advisory consultation with other
countries. But they could not have been extracted without the support of the major
European states.

During August 1945 the United States attempted unsuccessfully to placate growing Allied
opposition by agreeing to establish a Far Eastern Council. This concession was a compromise
reaction to Anglo-Australian requests. Acting with Australia’s support, Britain submitted a
comprehensive proposal in mid-August requesting a five-member Allied Council for Japan
comprising the United States, Britain, China, the Soviet Union and Australia.67 ‘In view of
Australian interest in the Pacific, the Australian part in the war against Japan, and the
expressed wish of the Australian Government to participate in the control of Japan’, the
Dominions’ Secretary advised Canberra, ‘we consider that Australia should be represented on
the Council’. Britain also proposed an additional, complementary Allied Advisory Council for
Japan, comprising the five members of the Control Council and representatives of New Zealand, Canada, South Africa, India, France, the Netherlands and the Philippines. ‘The function of the Advisory Committee should be to consider matters referred to them by the Control Council and to make recommendations to the Control Council,’ Britain suggested. If accepted these proposals would have provided for substantial combined British Commonwealth influence in both Councils. Moreover, separate Australian representation as a principal power in the control of Japan was incorporated in Britain’s recommendation for a Control Council.

The British proposals were given unequivocal support by Australia. However the Truman Administration was originally prepared only to establish an Advisory Council, not a Control Council with executive responsibilities. Secretary of State Byrnes suggested on 21 August that an Advisory Council be established to permit ‘full consultations...between the Allies on all problems relating to treatment of Japan after surrender’. He contemplated participation by the ‘Big Four’ and Australia, France, New Zealand, Canada, the Netherlands and the Philippines in the Washington-based Commission. But, the Dominions’ Office informed Canberra, ‘the United States does not (repeat not) favor any derogation from the principle that sole responsibility should be vested in the Supreme Commander’, and ‘it was not (repeat not) contemplated by the United States that an Allied Control Council should be set up to assist the Supreme Commander in the execution of his responsibilities’.

During September the United Kingdom, with active Australian support, continued to press for the five member Control Council in Tokyo in addition to a broad advisory Commission in Washington. Following a fresh indication that Washington was prepared to share responsibility for the control of Japan, Byrnes, Ernest Bevin and Evatt reached a tentative, compromise agreement. This permitted establishment of an Advisory Commission, but did not prejudice further consideration of supplementary control arrangements. Byrnes agreed to consider a Control Commission based in Tokyo after the Advisory Commission had been established in Washington. Nevertheless, the Commonwealth powers accepted – albeit reluctantly – that America would never participate in a Control Council in Japan based on the Berlin model, ‘or indeed any Commission which would be subject to veto of an individual power’.

The purely advisory eleven-member Washington Commission, formed on 23 October 1945, did not satisfy either Australia, Britain, or the Soviet Union. While the scope of its powers were being determined in Washington, Australia and Britain pressed for a five-member Control Council, preferably in Tokyo, responsible for deciding and issuing policy directives to MacArthur. Soviet pressure for a four-member Council continued. Despite vehement opposition to a Tokyo body from the Department of War and MacArthur, in late October the State Department retreated slightly from its inflexible opposition to a Great Power Council in Tokyo, and agreed to participate in an Allied Military Council in Tokyo.

However, this body was to be purely advisory, with no authority to alter policy favoured by MacArthur. It was proposed, Byrnes conceded privately to MacArthur, primarily ‘to enable the USSR to withdraw’ its opposition to the Washington Commission by accepting the Tokyo Council ‘which would appear to give the USSR and other major powers a position in connection with the occupation more in conformity to their real position than merely membership of an eleven-power Advisory Commission’. The Secretary of State attached ‘the greatest importance’ to Soviet membership of the Advisory Council, believing that a permanent Soviet absence might further undermine general Soviet-American relations. However this concession did not immediately induce the Soviet Union to withdraw its
opposition to the Commission. During November further concessions were made to Soviet, British and Australian requests.

Control arrangements for Japan were altered dramatically by the three major powers at the Moscow Council of Foreign Ministers in December 1945. Evatt’s concern with the possible outcome of this big power meeting was temporarily allayed by an assurance from Byrnes and Bevin that the discussions ‘must be purely preliminary and general in character’; final determination of all peace settlement issues would await ‘detailed review and final decision by all countries directly concerned’. The Chifley Government believed these assurances had been accepted ‘in principle’ by Byrnes and Bevin, but exhibited little confidence that America was prepared to fulfill them.78

New American proposals made at the time of the Moscow Conference incorporated – in a qualified form – provision for a Control Council which Australia, the Soviet Union, and Britain had consistently advocated. A suggestion that the Advisory Commission be replaced by a new Far Eastern Commission was the central aspect of the proposals. Theoretically, this new Commission could formulate Allied control policy. In addition, the United States agreed to an essentially supervisory Control Council in Tokyo, comprising representatives of the United States, Soviet Union, China, and one representative of the combined British Commonwealth powers.79

Although it supported replacement of the Advisory Commission with bodies in Washington and Tokyo, Australia protested against the proposed composition and terms of reference of the new bodies. The suggested Far Eastern Commission would have given either the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, or China the ability to veto any decision endorsed by a majority of the eleven-member Commission. The Soviet Union and the United States accepted this, as both wished to retain veto control over the multinational Commission. However Australia wanted separate and equal status with all other members. ‘If the four great powers are not prepared to participate’ on the basis that majority decisions prevail, Canberra emphasised, ‘then the work of the Commission will inevitably be stultified and the ultimate result might well be unilateral handing of the situation by the United States and the worsening of relations between the United States and the Soviet’.80 The War Cabinet remained ‘uncompromisingly opposed to the four power veto which could paralyse the work of the Commission’.81

Australia’s criticism of the projected Tokyo Control Council was equally strident. The failure of America’s proposal to permit Australia and Britain separate representation, while including both China and the Soviet Union, was opposed by both the Chifley and Attlee Governments. Inclusion of a combined British Commonwealth representative did not placate Australia because it implicitly failed to recognise the major belligerent role of the Dominion in the war, or its special regional interests in the Pacific peace settlement. Britain interpreted its omission as further evidence of America’s reluctance to accord it full status as a Great Power in the postwar community of states.82 Australia was anxious to employ British diplomacy to support its regional interests. Hence it opposed America’s efforts to limit British influence in the Far East, unless these gave concurrent recognition to an expansion of separate Australian influence.

Bevin conveyed these objections to the Moscow Conference. However, on 24 December, Canberra was advised by the British Government ‘that there was no chance of altering American policy on these issues’.83 Arrangements for the control of Japan were ultimately decided at Moscow in the absence of a majority of states previously involved as belligerents against Japan. In form and substance the control arrangements deviated little from the American proposals of December 1945 for a Washington Commission and a Tokyo Council. Yet these bodies had a broader composition and
wider responsibilities than the Truman Administration had anticipated or intended at the
time of the Japanese surrender in August. America’s response to persistent Allied
demands for effective participation in the control of defeated Japan was not completely
inflexible immediately after the end of hostilities in the Pacific.

Acting with the explicit concurrence of only one other Pacific ally, China, the Great
Powers announced the terms of the new control arrangements for Japan on 26 December
1945. A new Far Eastern Commission replaced the Advisory Commission in
Washington. In contrast to the original Commission, the new Washington body was
responsible for formulating Allied policy to govern Japan. Exclusive responsibility for
interpreting these decisions and translating them to MacArthur was reserved, however,
for the United States. The Commission was explicitly forbidden from making
‘recommendations with regard to the conduct of military operations’, or territorial
adjustments. Nor could it interfere with or alter existing control machinery in Japan,
‘including the chain of command from the United States Government to the Supreme
Commander, and the Supreme Commander’s command of occupation forces’.84

Although the voting procedure did not require unanimity to enable policy directives to
be adopted, the Commission could only act with less than unanimous consent after it had
gained the concurrence of at least a majority of all the representatives, including all
representatives of the United States, Soviet Union, Britain, and China. This clause gave
the major powers a veto control over the Commission. As the United States had
unilaterally determined and implemented existing occupation policy through the Initial
Post-Surrender directive and the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, the veto
permitted it to resist any modification of this policy. The other major powers could
obstruct the adoption of new policy, but unlike the United States they had not
determined existing policy. Hence formation of the Far Eastern Commission did not
alter the direction of American policy in Japan, or significantly undermine American
responsibility for determining and implementing this policy.

Nor did concurrent formation of the Allied Control Council for Japan substantially
reduce existing American authority over Japan. Membership of the Tokyo Council was
restricted to the Supreme Commander or his deputy, who was to be its Chairman and the
American representative, representatives of the Soviet Union and China, and ‘a member
representing jointly the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and India’. Australia’s
request for separate representation on a five-member Council was not accepted. Although ostensibly an Allied Control Council, its functions were purely
advisory and consultative. It was not a controlling body and could not interfere with the
freedom of the Supreme Commander to implement policy. The Supreme Commander ‘is
the sole executive authority for the Allied powers in Japan’, the Moscow announcement
of 26 December stipulated: ‘He will consult and advise with the Council in advance of
the issuance of orders on matters of substance…His decisions on these matters will be
controlling’.85

Despite these new arrangements, Australia remained acutely dissatisfied with both the
consultative machinery and the direction of American policy in Japan. Initially, the
Dominion refused to accept the invitation to join the Washington Commission because,
Evatt protested to Minter, the veto would frustrate the Commission's operation. Evatt
also protested that the veto implied ‘Australia’s status is to be regarded as in some way
inferior to that of other powers’.86 Not until 26 February 1946 did Australia formally
consent to join the Washington Commission. The decision of the interested
Commonwealth powers to appoint an Australian, W. Macmahon Ball, as their joint
representative on the Tokyo Council lessened, but did not remove, Australia’s
dissatisfaction with the control arrangements.87
The Far Eastern Commission and the Allied Control Council exposed American policy to closer scrutiny by its former Allies, but did not alter the direction of American policy established immediately after the collapse of Japan. America’s pre-eminent power and responsibility in the Pacific by mid-1945 was immediately translated into unilateral domination of Allied control policy and occupation of defeated Japan. As exercises in postwar co-operation amongst the victor powers or shared international responsibility for a defeated state, the compromise control bodies established in Washington and Tokyo were largely unsuccessful. The Australian representative on the Control Council commented as early as 1947, for example, that it was ‘on balance a failure, and at times a fiasco’.88 No issue created greater bilateral discord during the transition to peace in the Pacific than America’s resistance to Australia’s efforts to participate directly and effectively in formulating and implementing Allied policy in occupied Japan.

The contrasting policies adopted by Australia and the United States towards Japan reflected the disparate powers and divergent national interests of the former Pacific allies. The resolution of the Chifley Government to secure an equal voice in the councils which determined Allied policy and at least a token military presence in the actual occupation of Japan, was an interrelated aspect of its broader desire to help shape a Pacific settlement which would offer the strongest possible assurances against a resurgence of Japanese aggression, or indeed new Asiatic expansion from any source. This objective was foreshadowed in Australia’s efforts to broaden consultation amongst the Pacific Allies in the early war years, and in the central clauses of the Canberra Agreement. Its implementation demanded increased independent political and military initiatives in the Pacific and towards the Great Powers. But these initiatives did not necessarily imply a breakdown of Australian co-operation with British Commonwealth states. While it reflected and hastened the growth of Dominion autonomy in international affairs, Australia’s expanded regional role depended partly on general political support from Britain in international councils, and tacit British approval of Australia’s leadership of allegedly common Commonwealth interests in the Pacific. Through leadership of joint Commonwealth military and political activities, most notably in the British Commonwealth Occupation Force and Allied Control Council in Japan, Australia sought to reinforce its ambitious separate initiatives in the region. In particular, the Australian Government was anxious to restrict America’s domination of the Pacific settlement and to influence the direction of American or ‘Allied’ surrender and control procedures and policies in Japan.

Australia’s initiatives were only marginally responsible for America’s reluctant decision to set up international councils in Washington and Tokyo, and include small power representatives in the Washington Commission and a combined Commonwealth representative in the Control Council. Australia remained dissatisfied with these procedural arrangements; but it had gained a degree of advisory consultation which greatly exceeded that previously accorded the ‘small’ and ‘middle’ Allied Powers as members of the Pacific War Councils in London or Washington during 1942-1943. Evatt’s initiatives also influenced America’s decision to permit a combined British Commonwealth force to participate in the military occupation of Japan. Australia was responsible for commanding this force and made a greater manpower contribution to it than any other Commonwealth power. Although subject to overall American control, this Australian-dominated Commonwealth Force nonetheless contributed directly to the execution of Allied occupation policy in Japan.

The marked expansion of Australia’s regional influence and its more prominent international status in the postwar world, coincided with an unprecedented assertion of
American peacetime involvement in global affairs. Bilateral political contacts between the two powers increased in frequency and importance as a result of each country’s determined efforts to promote these altered international roles. Both powers attempted to maximise their respective influence on the Pacific settlement, as their strategic interests and policy objectives did not fully coincide. However, the resolution of these differences had ultimately to await the altered climate of international relations in the Far East which accompanied the Communist victory in China late in 1949, when the United States, and gradually Australia also, accepted that the threat of a resurgent Japan was far outweighed by the possibility of Communist expansion in Asia.

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NOTES

5. See, for example, Johnson to Hull, 22 January 1944, USNA747.47H/6; UK War Cabinet Memoranda, 1939-1945, WP (44) 70, Cab. 66/46, Public Records Office, London.
8. CCS to Australian War Cabinet, 3 June 1943, USNA 847.00/424.
14. CCS, ‘British Participation...against Japan’, 25 August 1944, CCS 370 ‘Great Britain’, 7/15/44, Section 1, USNA, Record Group 218; Curtin to Churchill, 4 July 1944, 12 August 1944 and 17 September 1944 cited Long ibid., pp 14-17.


26. Curtin, quoted Johnson to Hull, 14 September 1943, USNA 841.01/100.

27. Evatt to Stettinius, for Truman, 24 June 1945, USNA 740.0011PW (peace) 6-2445. See also Stettinius to Evatt, 26 June 1945, CAO A1066, p. 45/148/1.


36. ADEA, ‘For Evatt: Potsdam Meeting’, and Draft telegram to UK Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, hereafter SSDA, late July 1945, CAO A1066, p. 45/78/4/3; SSOA to ADEA, 2 August 1945, quoted Hasluck, op. cit., p. 593.

37. Minter to Byrnes, 31 July 1945, USNA 740.0011PW/7-3145.


39. ibid., p. 169. For details of Australia’s correspondence with London and Washington during August, see ‘Summary of Events Leading to Japan’s Withdrawal from War’, CAO A989, Microfilm 14610/55, No. 4. This summary is based on CAO Files p. 45/10/1, p. 45/10/32, and p. 45/10/35, but CAO has been unable to locate these files.

40. ADEA to SSDA 11 August 1945, and SSDA to ADEA, 12 August 1945, in ‘Summary of Events…’, ibid.


42. Eggleston to Evatt, 14 August 1945, and Telegram D1444, 15 August 1945, in ‘Summary of Events…’, CAO A989. Microfilm 14610/55 No. 4; and Eggleston to ADEA, 15 August 1945, CAO A1066, A45/2/3/4, pt. 1.
44. Eggleston to Makin, 24 August 1945, CAO A1066, A45/2/3/4. See also, Kolko, op. cit., p. 599, note 8, for evidence of the influence of the German situation on America’s policy in the final phase of war against Japan.
45. Johnson to Hull, 15 November 1944, USNA 747.47H/11-1744. See also, D’Alton to Evatt, 8 January 1944, CAO A989, 43/735/168.
46. ‘Summary of Events…’, CAO A989, Microfilm 14610/55, No. 4.
47. Minter to Byrnes, 14 August 1945, USNA 740.00119 PW/8-1445; Minter to Byrnes, 17 August 1945, US Department of State, Foreign Service Post Records, hereafter USDSFSPR, ‘Canberra, 1941-1947’, Record Group 84, Lot 56, F150, Box 030-800, held State Department, Washington.
48. Minter to Byrnes, 17 August 1945, ibid.
49. Evatt to Byrnes, 21 August 1945, USDSFSPR, ‘Canberra 1941-1947’, Record Group 84, Lot 56, F150, Box 030-800; Eggleston to Evatt, 16 August 1945, ‘Summary of Events…’, CAO A989, Microfilm 14610/55, No. 4.
50. Minter to Byrnes, 17 August 1945, USDSFSPR ibid., and Minter to Byrnes, 22 August 1945, USNA 740.00119 PW/8-2245.
52. Evatt to Byrnes, 21 August 1945, USDSFSPR, ‘Canberra, 1941-1947’, Record Group 84, Lot 56, F150, Box 030-800.
54. Evatt, 17 August 1945, CAC A989, Microfilm 14610/64, No. 4.
57. Eggleston, Washington Notes, 24 September 1945, Eggleston Papers, MS 423/10/756-760.
59. Vincent to Acheson, 19 November 1945, USNA 40.00119 Control Japan/10-2945.
60. Chifley, 29 August 1945, Australia, Current Notes on International Affairs, Vol. 16 August - September 1945, p. 171.
61. Chifley to SSDA, 10 September 1945, quoted Hasluck, op. cit., p. 610.
62. Evatt to Chifley, 14 September 1945, ‘Summary of Events….’, CAO A989, Microfilm 14610/55 No. 4.
63. Australia, War Cabinet Minute 4400, 19 September 1945, and SSDA to Australian Government, 1 October 1945, cited Hasluck, op. cit., pp. 610-11.
64. The Sydney Morning Herald, 16 January 1946, p.2.
66. See, for example, Eggleston, ‘Washington Notes’, 10, 15, and 20 September 1945, Eggleston Papers, M5 423/10/744-47; 463-68; and 751-55.
67. US State-War-Navy Co-ordinating Committee, ‘Politico-Military Problems in the Far East’, Appendix A, 31 August 1945, in CCS 334 Allied Control Council (Japan), Section I, USNA Record Group 218. By 20 August these proposals had reached Washington. For evidence of Australia’s concurrence, see SSDA to ADEA, 21 August 1945, CAO A989, Microfilm 14610/65, No. 4.
68. SSDA to ADEA, 17 August, 27 August, and 29 August, 1945, in CAO A989, Microfilm 14610/65, No. 4.
69. Evatt to Eggleston, 23 August 1945, CAO A989, Microfilm 14610/65, No. 4.
70. SSDA to ADEA, 29 August and 27 August 1945, CAO A989, Microfilm 14610/65, No. 4.
71. See, for example, Winant to Byrnes, 22 September 1945, USNA 740.00119 Control (Japan)/9-2245.
72. Evatt to Chifley, 29 September 1945, SSDA to Evatt, 30 September 1945; Burton to Hood, 12 October 1945; and Evatt to Byrnes, 10 October 1945, all in CAO A989, Microfilm 14610/65, No. 4.
73. Eggleston, ‘Meeting of Heads…’, 6 October 1945, Eggleston Papers, MS 423/10/470-75.
74. SSDA to Evatt, 30 September 1945, CAO A989, Microfilm 14610/65, No. 4.
75. Evatt to Byrnes, 26 October 1945, USNA 740.00119 Control (Japan)/10-2645; Acheson, Memo, 24 October 1945, USNA 740.00119 FEAC/10-2445; Byrnes to MacArthur, 22 October 1945, and 25 October 1945, CCS 334 Allied Control Council (Japan), 4/17/45, Section I, USNA Record Group 218.
76. Vincent to Acheson, 24 October 1945, USNA 740.00119 FEAC/10-2445. See also, Byrnes to MacArthur, ibid.
77. Byrnes to MacArthur, ibid.
79. SSDA to Australian War Cabinet, 21 December 1945 and 27 December 1945, CAO A1066, H45/1016/4/1.
82. ibid.; SSDA to Australian War Cabinet, 21 December 1945, and 22 December 1945, CAO A1066, H/45/1016/4/1; Makin to Maloney, 14 December 1945, CAO A1066, P45/78/4/4.
83. SSDA to Australian War Cabinet, 24 December 1945, CAO A1066, H45/1016/4/1.
84. SSDA to ADEA, 27 December 1945, CAO A1066, H45/1016/4/1.
85. ibid.
87. See, for example, Evatt, quoted, The Sydney Morning Herald, 27 February 1946, p. 1.
88. W. Macmahon Ball, Japan: Enemy or Ally?, Melbourne, 1948, p. 42.